Large-Scale Sympathy and Simultaneity in George Eliot’s Romola by Jacob Jewusiak
SEL Studies in English Literature 1500-1900, Volume 54, Number 4,
Autumn 2014, pp. 853-874 (Article)
DOI: 10.1353/sel.2014.0044
For additional information about this article
                                                   Access provided by your local institution (10 Mar 2015 20:24 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sel/summary/v054/54.4.jewusiak.html
Jacob Jewusiak 853SEL 54, 4 (A tumn 2014): 853–874
ISSN 0039-3657
© 2014 Rice University
8
Large-Scale Sympathy and  
Simultaneity in George Eliot’s 
Romola
JACOB JEWUSIAK
George Eliot begins her historical novel Romola (1862–63) in 
Renaissance Florence shortly after the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici. 
The political turmoil that ensues signals a shift from the old or-
der to what the narrator describes as “government on a broader 
basis.”1 George Eliot’s interest in the transition from an oligarchy 
to a republic hinges on how individuals—especially those in posi-
tions of leadership—relate to the needs of large groups of people: 
how does one know what a multitude of citizens, signified by a 
term like “Florence,” wants or feels?2 This question is answered by 
Romola’s theorization of large-scale sympathy, which attempts to 
include individuals outside one’s immediate social sphere without 
becoming so wide as to evacuate content from that sympathy. The 
novel pivots on the performance of large-scale acts of sympathy 
with strangers, such as the attempts—particularly by the Frate 
Girolamo Savonarola, Tito Melema, and Romola de’ Bardi—to 
imagine the experience of, and still act ethically toward, others 
with whom they are not familiar.
Romola’s narrative on the volatility of Florentine politics 
provides George Eliot with a representative occurrence through 
which to explore the operation of sympathy in the wake of Victo-
rian concerns about large groups of newly enfranchised English. 
Given the complexity and magnitude of the large group, is sym-
pathy even possible on such a scale?3 If so, what are the condi-
tions that facilitate such an act? I am defining a large-scale act 
of sympathy as a relation between an individual and a group of 
people who solicit sympathy from that individual. The specific size 
of the group is less important than the fact that this group has 
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enough people to give it an identifying feature that might solicit 
sympathy. The city-state of Florence might provoke a large-scale 
sympathetic response, but so might a group of people within that 
city—for example, the Mediceans or the Dominicans. While the 
number of individuals within the group may or may not be count-
able, the number must not be so small that it can be instantly 
intuited.4 As such, acts of large-scale sympathy necessarily involve 
an expansive and agile imagination that is capable of producing 
feeling outside the limits of immediate experience. 
Large-scale sympathy has received much less attention from 
critics than the kind of sympathy that is performed between 
individuals. Even when critics claim to account for large-scale 
sympathy, this often manifests as a generalization of what a char-
acter does on an individual basis to what that character might do 
on a larger scale.5 Most relevant to my argument is the work of 
Candace Clark, who, in the context of her analysis of the “social 
form” of American sympathy, provides an account of sympathy 
that allows for “feeling for people we will never know.”6 According 
to Clark, “Even in the absence of a face-to-face relationship, a 
sympathizer can open a sympathy account for a stranger to whom 
he or she feels related by common membership in a particular 
community, society, or in the general category of humankind.”7 
In Romola, George Eliot tests the limits of sympathy generated “in 
the absence of a face-to-face relationship,” thereby interrogating 
the symbolic function of “common membership” in facilitating 
large-scale acts of sympathy. George Eliot represents large-scale 
sympathy as a primarily temporal relation not necessarily bound 
to the object of sympathy by spatial proximity. This large-scale 
sympathy permits the imagining of unknown others who exist 
alongside one’s self and yet are outside one’s everyday experience.8 
In her novel, large-scale sympathy always involves detaching the 
individual from the personal relations in his or her life, or a shifting 
from the individual diachronic experience to the synchronic, in 
order to create the possibility for an individual to relate ethically 
to large groups. But such detachment has the tendency to disable 
the crosscurrents of affect that make sympathy an ethical act.9 
In what follows, I argue that we read George Eliot’s Romola 
as an experiment that assesses the limits of sympathy when con-
fronted with the multitude of subjects that linger outside one’s 
immediate experience.10 Romola presents the reality that there 
are too many objects requiring a sympathetic response at any 
given time. As much of George Eliot’s critique is linked with the 
way particular characters in Romola correspond with a certain 
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scale of sympathy, my argument will proceed as a case study of 
characters, addressing the following problems: first, the failure 
of minor characters to hold multiple objects of sympathy in their 
minds at the same time; second, Savonarola’s tendency to avoid 
this difficulty by grouping objects of sympathy into a generaliza-
tion; and third, the danger that large-scale sympathy poses for 
the operation of sympathy on an individual scale. In the most fully 
realized episode of large-scale sympathy in the novel—Romola’s 
intervention in the plague village—the possibility of large-scale 
sympathy appears as a tenuous negotiation between the collective 
and individual registers of social experience. 
Renaissance Florence provides George Eliot with an example 
of the difficulty of faithfully representing large, heterogeneous 
populations—a political problem that England faced in the early 
1860s as Parliament debated increasing the franchise with an-
other Reform Act.11 In Romola, large-scale sympathy provides a 
solution to this political crisis; it holds out the utopian possibility 
for leaders to meet the wants and needs of the multitude both 
accurately and ethically. George Eliot warns, however, that this 
solution can devolve into an ethically neutral engagement when 
individuals exploit knowledge about the multitude for personal 
gain. Thus, what Romola allows us to see is a fault line at the 
heart of George Eliot’s work whereby the necessity of imagining 
the simultaneous experience of others is continually brought into 
conflict with the impossibility—and the danger—of doing so.12
MInoR ChARACTERS AnD ThE FAILURE oF SyMPAThy
In his study of characterization and the nineteenth-century 
realist tradition, Alex Woloch argues that there are “dual impulses 
to bring in a multitude of characters and to bring out the interior-
ity of a singular protagonist.”13 Woloch is especially interested in 
the dynamics of the minor character, whose “strange significance 
… resides largely in the way that the character disappears, and 
in the tension or relief that results from this vanishing.”14 While 
such a claim is likely true of the minor character in any realist 
novel, it holds a special resonance for those minor characters in 
Romola that are consistently unable to imagine the concurrent 
experiences of other minor characters, and instead channel their 
sympathy into a single object at the expense of everyone else. 
Privileging only a single object of sympathy, characters such as 
Tessa, Bardo de’ Bardi, and Baldassarre Calvo demonstrate how 
minor characters are erased or forgotten from the narrative. The 
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difficulty that minor characters have in sympathizing with more 
than one object at a time produces a critique of sympathy that is 
based solely on a spatial model; these characters are represented 
as dimwitted, antisocial, and deranged, primarily because they 
are unable to imagine the experiences of others that proceed si-
multaneously outside their immediate proximity. 
The difficulty of confronting the expansiveness of simultane-
ity is registered in Tessa’s myopia. The novel’s villain, Tito, has 
two wives: his lawfully wedded wife, Romola, a respected member 
of Florentine society, and his “other wife,” Tessa, a Contadina 
whom he tricks into believing that she is married to him (p. 432). 
When Tito leaves Tessa’s immediate proximity, she is unable to 
imagine Tito’s deceit; her “mind had never formed an image of 
his whereabout or his doings when she did not see him: he had 
vanished, and her thought, instead of following him, had stayed 
in the same spot where he was with her” (p. 146). When Romola 
discovers Tessa’s identity later in the novel, she does not feel an-
ger or disgust toward the affair with his “other wife” but rather 
disbelief, asking Tessa, “and you never know where your husband 
goes to when he leaves you?” (p. 438). Tessa cannot imagine that 
Tito has a life that proceeds simultaneously with her own. her 
experience is limited to her immediate surroundings; while Tessa 
waits for Tito, she does not imagine the things that he might be 
doing in the meantime. Instead, the moment Tito leaves Tessa’s 
side, it is as if his life pauses, only to resume when she sees him 
again, proceeding in time with herself. yet, when Tito sleeps on 
Tessa’s lap, his very proximity seems to overwhelm her conscious-
ness: “She was too happy to go to sleep—too happy to think that 
Tito would wake up, and that then he would leave her, and she 
must go home. It takes very little water to make a perfect pool 
for a tiny fish, where it will find its world and paradise all in one, 
and never have a presentiment of the dry bank” (p. 105). When 
he is away, Tessa cannot imagine that Tito has an independent 
and concurrent experience of his own; when he is with her, Tessa 
is incapable of imagining a world (the “dry bank”) outside that 
specific space. In short, Tessa is so engrossed in her immediate 
experience that she closes off everything else—even the simple 
awareness that other people exist contemporaneously with herself.
This myopia is further illustrated by Romola’s scholarly father, 
Bardo, who is chastised by his cousin for closing himself off from 
the world: “[I]f I didn’t bring you some news of the world now and 
then, I do believe you’d forget there was anything in life but these 
mouldy ancients” (p. 118). Bardo’s lack of interest in the “news 
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of the world” signifies his reluctance to acknowledge events that 
occur simultaneously with his own experience. Instead, he takes 
refuge in the “mouldy ancients” who exist outside the current of 
the present time. Bardo’s physical blindness, a condition that 
he describes as a “world of memory in which the distant seems 
to grow clearer and the near to fade,” embodies his refusal to 
imagine the experiences of others (p. 123). If Bardo’s blindness 
facilitates his academic project, a similar kind of myopia helps 
to fuel Baldassarre’s revenge. Betrayed by his adopted son Tito 
and traumatized by slavery, Baldassarre spends most of the 
novel impotently obsessing over his vengeance. Consumed with 
the injustice of his lot, Baldassarre’s hatred restricts his sense 
of social relations by focusing his attention on a single person: “I 
only know one man,” he says to Tessa (p. 281). In each case, the 
text registers how the narrow focus on one’s own interests comes 
at the cost of imagining the experiences of others. 
In Romola, the failure of characters to engage in large-scale 
sympathy has ethical repercussions. In the obsessive drive to 
master a single object, these myopic characters—both unfairly 
and unknowingly—implicate other people in their own schemes; 
for example, Bardo’s interest in academic subjects overshadows 
his responsibility to his daughter, whom he uses as a pawn to 
facilitate his research. These characters practice an egocentrism 
that results in a social myopia whereby the many are either ig-
nored or reduced to insignificance. George Eliot later transposes 
her critique of this egocentrism to the level of narration when 
the narrator interrupts the story of Middlemarch: A Study in Pro-
vincial Life to ask, “But why always Dorothea? Was her point of 
view the only possible one with regard to this marriage?”15 George 
Eliot stresses that, when the narrator only follows the story of 
Dorothea Brooke, the reader forgets or ignores the fact that other 
characters are having thoughts simultaneously with Dorothea. 
The reader is in danger of reducing the elderly scholar, Edward 
Casaubon, to a set of “blinking eyes” and “moles” that stand in 
for the “intense consciousness within him.”16 With the rupture 
of narrative continuity signaled by “why always Dorothea?,” the 
reader is immediately alerted to the presence of multiple, simul-
taneous narratives that also deserve his or her attention. Despite 
the allure of “young skins,” there is an obligation on the part of 
narrative to offer even the “faded” characters to the reader’s sym-
pathies.17 The egocentrism of Tessa, Baldassarre, and Bardo is 
implicated in Middlemarch’s argument against narrative myopia, 
and both novels critique a sympathy that is routed exclusively 
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from one individual to another. This critique suggests the need 
for an alternative way of relating to—and sympathizing with—the 
multitude of people that exist simultaneously with one’s self.18 
SyMPAThy, SCALE, AnD GEnERALIzATIon
In contrast to the myopia of the novel’s minor characters, 
Savonarola experiences the difficulty of reconciling his fantasy 
of a “universal Church” with the realities of his expanding con-
gregation (p. 198). Charismatic, politically savvy, and intensely 
spiritual, Savonarola’s ambition to “represent all Christendom” 
resonates with the expansiveness of simultaneity, but his goal 
of social and moral reform—what he calls “unseen Purity”—is 
continually problematized by the existence of discrete individuals 
within his social generalizations (pp. 200 and 479–80). Savon-
arola’s rise to power is marked by his tendency to generalize large 
groups of people as a collective body, an expedient that allows him 
to sidestep the difficult task of engaging with an overwhelming 
number of individuals. In his sermons, for example, he repeatedly 
addresses his audience as “Italy,” “Florence,” “people,” or “my 
children” (pp. 216–7 and 479). Although practical, Savonarola’s 
use of generalizations underscores a deeper need to sympathize 
with his audience by projecting solidarity upon it. This need is 
inflected in the religious garb that distinguishes the Florentine 
monks: “Every one knew that these mysterious forms were Flo-
rentine citizens of various ranks, who might be seen at ordinary 
times going about the business of the shop, the counting house, 
or the State; but no member now was discernible as son, hus-
band, or father. They had dropped their personality, and walked 
as symbols of a common vow … the garb of all was a complete 
shroud, and left no expression but that of fellowship” (p. 357). As 
many scholars have already shown, George Eliot’s fiction under-
lines the “ethical importance of particularizing”; the problem that 
Savonarola raises, however, is the difficulty of modulating one’s 
sympathy when there are multiple particulars—individuals—that 
require a sympathetic response at the same time.19 
By directing his sympathy toward the universal rather than 
the individual, Savonarola loses the flexibility to account for the 
fluctuations of human sympathies and the vicissitudes of the indi-
vidual lot. For example, when a group of prominent Mediceans are 
convicted of treason and sentenced to death (including Romola’s 
godfather, Bernardo del nero), Savonarola justifies revoking their 
right of appeal by the following: “The death of five men—were 
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they less guilty than these—is a light matter weighed against the 
withstanding of the vicious tyrannies which stifle the life of Italy 
… a light matter weighed against the furthering of God’s Kingdom 
upon earth” (p. 464). In other words, the few must be sacrificed 
for the greater good. Romola’s attempt to create sympathy for her 
elderly godfather has little traction in the face of the generaliza-
tion of “God’s Kingdom.” As a consequence, Bernardo is executed 
shortly after Romola’s meeting with Savonarola. While the scale 
of his ministry is expansive, Savonarola is unable or unwilling 
to refocus his sympathy on the individual. his error in deciding 
Bernardo’s fate is neatly summarized by the complaint of Lorenzo 
Tornabuoni, a member of the group of Florentines loyal to the 
exiled Medici: “This theory of the Frate’s, that we are to have a 
popular government, in which every man is to strive only for the 
general good, and know no party names, is a theory that may do 
for some isle of Cristoforo Colombo’s finding, but will never do 
for our fine old quarrelsome Florence” (p. 327).20 Tornabuoni’s 
comparison suggests that Savonarola’s failure results from the 
inability of his theory to account for Florence’s heterogeneity and 
its large scale. It would be much better, Tornabuoni suggests, that 
Savonarola deploy his generalizations on a social group that is 
delimited and homogenous—“some isle of Cristoforo Colombo’s 
finding”—rather than the complex and expansive society of Flor-
ence.
The slippage in Savonarola’s ethical judgment between the 
individual and the aggregate is exemplified by his evasion of 
personal contact with other individuals. Tornabuoni expresses 
the difficulty of arranging a private meeting with the Frate: “I 
have been favoured with an interview in the Frate’s own cell, 
which, let me tell you, is not a common favour” (p. 326). When 
Romola schedules a meeting with him, the narrator observes that 
“[t]he rigidity with which Savonarola guarded his life from all the 
pretexts of calumny made such interviews very rare, and when-
ever they were granted, they were kept free from any appearance 
of mystery” (p. 456). Savonarola’s recoil from the individual is 
embodied in the admonition that he gives to Romola: “you have 
lived with those who sit on a hill aloof, and look down on the 
life of their fellow-men … As if you, a wilful wanderer, following 
your own blind choice, were not below the humblest Florentine 
woman who stretches forth her hands with her own people, and 
craves a blessing for them; and feels a close sisterhood with the 
neighbor who kneels beside her and is not of her own blood; and 
thinks of the mighty purpose that God has for Florence” (p. 341). 
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The Frate begins by encouraging Romola to renounce her indi-
vidualism and recognize the fact that she exists alongside—even 
below—the “humblest” woman. This responsibility branches out 
to “sisterhood with the neighbor” and culminates in generating 
sympathy for an entire city. he advises Romola to engage in large-
scale sympathy and to feel “the glow of a common life with the 
lost multitude” (p. 342). There is no room for the individual in 
Savonarola’s doctrine, just as there is no room for the individual 
in his personal life; individual specificity is continually sacrificed 
upon the altar of ever-expanding social generalizations. 
The narrator illustrates how the large-scale nature of Sa-
vonarola’s ethical project—the vastness and heterogeneity of his 
congregation—threatens to overwhelm it: “no man ever struggled 
to retain power over a mixed multitude without suffering vitiation: 
his standard must be their lower needs, and not his own best in-
sight” (p. 223). Eventually, Savonarola’s generalizations lose touch 
with the very people for whom they are supposed to account. In 
his attempt to include everyone, Savonarola merely gestures to 
the lowest common denominator. George Eliot identified a similar 
tendency in contemporary politicians early in her career. In “The 
natural history of the German Life,” she writes, “Probably, if we 
could ascertain the images called up by the terms ‘the people,’ 
‘the masses,’ ‘the proletariat,’ ‘the peasantry,’ by many who theo-
rize on those bodies with eloquence … we should find that they 
indicate almost as small an amount of concrete knowledge—that 
they are as far from completely representing the complex facts 
summed up in the collective term, as the railway images of our 
non-locomotive gentleman. how little the real characteristics of 
the working classes are known to those who are outside them.”21 
Without the direct experience of the working class, politicians de-
rive their policies from impressions that they receive from painters 
“still under the influence of idyllic literature, which has always 
expressed the imagination of the cultivated and town-bred, rather 
than the truth of rustic life.”22 Thus, without direct knowledge, 
those in power “talked for the ‘people,’ and forgot that the peas-
ants were included in the term.”23 George Eliot warns that the 
substitution of the artistic ideal for actual experience cultivates 
this tendency toward political generalization. This generalization, 
in turn, replaces the individuals of a social group with a stereo-
type, since the term “people” does not include any people at all. 
Rather, the “people” refers to the highly mediated image of the 
“peasant” that is separated from its referent, an idealization that 
has become a generalization obscuring the original ground. Such 
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“acts of distancing,” Amanda Anderson suggests, “produce a more 
primary effect, which is psychological: the underdevelopment of 
the moral faculties, particularly the faculty of sympathy.”24 
nevertheless, the target of George Eliot’s criticism—the “many 
who theorize on those bodies with eloquence”—does not protect 
her against relying on the same kind of generalization that she 
critiques in others.25 As Amanda Anderson goes on to argue, 
George Eliot’s critique in “The natural history of the German 
Life” ultimately results in a conflicted position that forces her “to 
mediate between sympathetic immersion and detached analysis 
and judgment.”26 In a surprising way, Savonarola is capable of 
both as he addresses “the wide multitude” as if this composite 
group were an individual entity in which “[e]very changing tone, 
vibrating through the audience, shook them into answering emo-
tion” (p. 218). Through this gesture, Savonarola illustrates the 
possibility of large-scale sympathy. yet such an act cannot be 
sustained for long. not only does Savonarola bring together the 
people of Florence to purify them, but he also creates the condi-
tions of their dissolution; the crowd, as critics of George Eliot have 
noted, is a force of destruction as well as reform.27 It is not long 
until the crowd—now a “hooting multitude”—abuses Savonarola 
as he is escorted to prison: “[h]e felt himself spat upon, smitten 
and kicked with grossest words of insult” (p. 509). The large-scale 
act of sympathy, like the one performed by Savonarola, is fleeting. 
The magnitude of Savonarola’s public addresses physically 
and emotionally exhausts him so that he cannot sustain long-term 
sympathetic engagement; the narrator notes “the passion with 
which he offered himself as a victim became at last too strong to 
allow of further speech, and he ended with a sob” (p. 218).28 While 
the temporality of large-scale sympathy is determined in part by 
the psychological and physiological limitations of the subject, it 
also results from the methodological assumptions that make such 
an act possible in the first place. Savonarola uses generalizations 
as a means of addressing his object of sympathy, and thus, he 
detaches himself from a diachronic experience; in other words, 
for Savonarola, the multitude is not a group of individuals that 
proceed through time, but a synchronic snapshot—the general-
ization—that represents the simultaneous experience of others.29 
Simultaneity cultivates a detached, synchronic perspective of the 
organization of social bodies that provides a much wider purview 
than the situated knowledge that direct experience produces. Such 
temporal distancing in Romola parallels what Amanda Anderson 
identifies in her reading as George Eliot’s desire to “mediate 
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between sympathetic immersion and detached analysis.” But it 
also suggests that, if large-scale sympathy is possible, then it is 
only so momentarily.
Sympathizing with a group—with “the many”—has the prob-
lematic tendency toward devolving into sympathizing with a gen-
eralization rather than the discrete individuals that compose the 
group. While generalization is a tempting solution to the problem 
of managing one’s sympathy on a large scale, George Eliot sug-
gests in Romola and “The natural history of the German Life” that 
this universalizing tendency is insufficient as an ethical response. 
Indeed, such a response derives from the mistaken assumption 
that sympathy operates in the same way at both the micro and 
the macro levels. Rae Greiner argues “Sympathy takes place in 
time, in what we might call narrative time. here simultaneity is 
replaced by more protracted, reflexive, and deliberative acts.”30 
While this may be true for sympathy on an individual level, when 
it comes to large-scale sympathy, the conditions that produce a 
successful act are primarily synchronic in nature. As such, though 
processing sympathy collectively has the virtue of being expansive, 
it is also overwhelming and fleeting. As I have already stated, it 
is difficult to remember others who exist outside of one’s social 
context; while characters such as Tessa, Bardo, and Baldassarre 
are incapable of such an act, Savonarola resorts to generalizing 
as a way to manage his sympathy, gaining and losing his object 
of sympathy at the same time. 
nARRATIVE oMnISCIEnCE AnD ThE CoSMoPoLITAn 
STAKES oF SIMULTAnEITy
Early in the novel, nello, the loquacious barber, explains the 
difference between his chosen profession and that of an author: 
“now a barber can be dispassionate; the only thing he necessar-
ily stands by is the razor, always providing he is not an author 
… I saw very early that authorship is a narrowing business, in 
conflict with the liberal art of the razor, which demands an im-
partial affection for all men’s chins” (p. 35). Even as the novel 
represents a wide swath of society, it is by necessity a “narrow-
ing business” that is partial to the representation of only a few 
characters’ chins. nello highlights a problem that is fundamental 
to the projects both of narrative omniscience and of cosmopoli-
tanism: how does one balance the multitude of objects available 
to one’s sympathies at any given time? Approaching the level of 
the narrator’s omniscience, Tito embodies a cosmopolitan ideal 
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while problematizing the way that the narrator tries to channel 
sympathy into a single story. Preternaturally aware of things that 
are happening simultaneously with his actions, and yet unwill-
ing to act upon the channels of sympathy that such awareness 
creates, Tito indicates that the problem of large-scale sympathy 
is perspectival, related to the detached positions of omniscience 
and cosmopolitanism. If Savonarola illustrates how an act of 
large-scale sympathy is possible only momentarily, Tito shows 
how it is potentially dangerous insofar as large-scale sympathy 
contributes to two related problems: first, the obfuscation of 
the feeling that makes a sympathetic act ethical; and second, 
the tendency of large-scale sympathy to make individual acts of 
sympathy seem inconsequential.
In Amanda Anderson’s account, the cultivation of detach-
ment—the aspiration to distance one’s self from a given discourse 
in order to understand it—forms the basis of the Victorian notion 
of cosmopolitanism, or the “reflective distance from one’s original 
or primary cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other 
cultures and customs, and a belief in universal humanity.”31 
Cast ashore after his boat was attacked by a Turkish slave ship, 
Tito is Romola’s most cosmopolitan character. Tito says to Bardo 
during his interview early in the novel, “I have resided both at 
Constantinople and Thessalonica, and have traveled in various 
parts little visited by Western Christians since the triumph of the 
Turkish arms” (p. 59). he adds, “I have rested in the groves of 
helicon, and tasted of the fountain hippocrene … high over every 
fastness, from the plains of Lacedæmon to the straits of Thermo-
pylæ, there towers some huge Frankish fortress, once inhabited 
by a French or Italian marquis, now either abandoned or held by 
Turkish bands” (p. 65). Tito’s extensive scholarship matches his 
extensive travel; indeed, it is upon the basis of his wide-ranging 
knowledge and quick intellect that Tito first begins to have suc-
cess in Florence, ingratiating himself to the Florentine secretary, 
Bartolommeo Scala. In line with the cosmopolitan ideal, Tito also 
has refined taste; at a dinner hosted by Bernardo Rucellai, he 
enjoys supper with exquisitely crafted cutlery and the expensive, if 
inedible, delicacy of peacock flesh. Tito’s cosmopolitan tendencies 
give him the critical distance necessary for a successful political 
career, but they also have the negative effect of making him cal-
lously insensitive to others. Pleased with the effect of his oration 
to a crowd of Florentines, Tito comments, “The gestures and faces 
of weavers and dyers were certainly amusing when looked at from 
above in this way” (p. 250). 
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To fulfill his cosmopolitan aspirations, Tito practices a version 
of large-scale sympathy that is detached from an ethical register.32 
Exceptionally sensitive to what people are doing and thinking 
even when he is not in immediate contact with them, Tito uses 
his insight into large groups as a means of pursuing his political 
schemes. The narrator remarks of Tito, “It was very easy, very 
pleasant, this exercise of speaking to the general satisfaction: a 
man who knew how to persuade need never be in danger from 
any party; he could convince each that he was feigning with all 
the others” (p. 250). During a critical moment of indeterminacy 
as Savonarola, Dolfo Spini, and the Mediceans vie for power, Tito 
attaches himself to the interests of each faction: “he managed his 
affairs so cleverly, that all results, he considered, must turn to 
his advantage. Whichever party came uppermost, he was secure 
of favour and money” (p. 379). This kind of maneuvering is only 
one example among many where Tito’s imagination proceeds along 
several tracks simultaneously. When his fortunes are threatened 
by Romola’s brother, Dino de’ Bardi, “[h]is heart sank at the prob-
ability that a great change was coming over his prospects, while 
at the same time his thoughts were darting over a hundred details 
of the course he would take when the change had come” (p. 130, 
emphasis added). Tito’s cosmopolitanism is matched by a tempo-
ral detachment that allows him to intuit easily the simultaneous 
thoughts, feelings, and actions of others—a synchronic operation 
that facilitates cosmopolitanism’s global aspirations. The obvious 
ethical problem, as Tito’s machinations demonstrate, is that such 
knowledge can be used for the exploitation of others just as easily 
as it can be used for their good. 
Although Tito, as Romola observes, has “the power of seeing 
everything without seeming to see it,” his hubristic certainty of 
what multiple people are doing and thinking at the same time 
erodes his ability to engage sympathetically with individuals (p. 
362).33 After Tito surreptitiously sells the library of Romola’s de-
ceased father, tensions run high between Tito and his wife. When 
Tito leaves the house, the narrator observes that, “Tito felt that 
Romola was a more unforgiving woman than he had imagined … 
Still, this petrified coldness was better than a passionate, futile 
opposition” (p. 302). however, Tito misreads Romola in a way that 
illustrates his inability to sympathize with her: “But when the door 
had closed on Tito, Romola lost the look of cold immobility which 
came over her like an inevitable frost whenever he approached 
her. Inwardly she was very far from being in a state of quiet en-
durance” (p. 302). The more Tito becomes embroiled in political 
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affairs—the more success that he has deducing and exploiting the 
motives of the many factions in Florence—the more desensitized 
he becomes to the needs and feelings of the individuals around 
him: “[h]e found it the less difficult to wait patiently for the return 
of his home happiness, because his life out of doors was more and 
more interesting to him … his imagination had glanced continu-
ally towards a sort of political activity which the troubled public 
life of Florence was likely enough to find occasion for” (p. 297). 
Given Tito’s ability to process simultaneity at the macro level, 
the reader might expect him to navigate personal relations with 
ease. however, Tito’s downfall is precipitated by his failure to ac-
count for the actions of a single, relatively insignificant individual. 
When Spini asks Tito’s opinion on a certain notary, Ser Ceccone, 
Tito vouches for Ceccone’s talents. But his recommendation is 
based on the fact that Ceccone knows incriminating information 
about Tito: it was Ceccone who overheard Tito promise Romola 
that he would circumvent the assassination plot against Savon-
arola—news that would infuriate Tito’s coconspirator, Spini. So, 
Tito lends Ceccone his support “believing that with this sop and 
the expectation of more, the waspish cur must be quite cured 
of the disposition to bite him” (p. 489). But, the narrator warns, 
“[P]erfect scheming demands omniscience, and the notary’s envy 
had been stimulated into hatred by causes of which Tito knew 
nothing” (p. 490). What Tito does not know is that Ceccone was 
also busy collecting evidence against the Mediceans. Ceccone’s 
hatred derives from the fact that his own intelligence is too late 
and less detailed than Tito’s, and thus worthless. The two men 
play at the same game, and the loser is the one who incorrectly 
processes the simultaneous thoughts and actions of the other. 
Ceccone’s betrayal serves as a reminder that Tito’s machina-
tions fall short of the narrator’s omniscient plotting, for “perfect 
scheming demands omniscience.”34 As if to assure the reader of 
this fact, the narrator reiterates only three paragraphs later that, 
“Tito, however, not being quite omniscient, felt now no more than 
a passing twinge of uneasiness at the suggestion of Ceccone’s 
power to hurt him” (p. 491). The observation that Tito is not “quite 
omniscient” registers the fatal insufficiency of his social knowl-
edge.35 Chased down by an angry mob, Tito attempts to save his 
life by jumping into a river and swimming to safety. Though he 
survives the mob and the current of the river, he washes ashore 
into the vengeful hands of his father, Baldassarre, who presses 
“his knuckles against the round throat [of Tito], and [kneels] upon 
the chest with all the force of his aged frame” (p. 516). Ultimately, 
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Tito’s death cannot be attributed to the fact that he is out-schemed 
by Ceccone—Ceccone tells Spini about Tito’s betrayal, Spini di-
rects the mob to Tito’s house, the mob molests Tito, and then Tito 
escapes and washes up safely on the banks of the river. The fact 
that Baldassarre waits in the exact spot that Tito emerges from 
the river is not part of this causal chain. Thus, it is not plotting 
but chance and coincidence that bring Tito to his death.36 Tito is 
destroyed by the character who is least like the omniscient nar-
rator; no longer able to plot his revenge, Baldassarre just waits 
by the river for the occasional piece of bread or raw carrot to float 
his way. Moreover, the fact that Tito is killed by the most myopic 
character in the novel underwrites the failure of Tito’s detached 
perspective to account for the things that should be the easiest 
for him to acknowledge: individual—even familial—relations.
In the “Proem” to Romola, George Eliot sets the stage for her 
novel by imagining a stereotypical “old Florentine” who is both 
cosmopolitan and regional: “his politics had an area as wide as 
his trade, which stretched from Syria to Britain, but they had also 
the passionate intensity, and the detailed practical interest, which 
could belong only to a narrow scene of corporate action; only to the 
members of a community shut in close by the hills and by walls 
of six miles’ circuit, where men knew each other as they passed 
in the street” (p. 6). The marriage of expansive politics with the 
“narrow scene of corporate action” is something that eludes Tito, 
ultimately resulting in the failure of his sweeping and nefarious 
ambitions. As George Eliot’s idealization of the Florentine sug-
gests, the wide view offered by detachment—whether it be cosmo-
politan or narratological—works best when it is balanced by an 
ethics that is grounded in the individual experience. The problem 
that George Eliot presents in Romola is that the reconciliation 
of these two positions is extremely difficult, if not impossible. In 
order to realize a positive model of large-scale sympathy, George 
Eliot looks outside Florence and the conventions of nineteenth-
century realism. In the next section, I argue that Romola’s bizarre 
intervention in a plague village reads like an instruction manual 
for large-scale sympathy, albeit one that both revises and com-
promises the global aspirations of Savonarola and Tito.
RoMoLA In ThE PLAGUE VILLAGE
Throughout most of the novel, Romola oscillates between two 
responses to the experiences of others: the myopia that afflicts 
Tessa, Bardo, and Baldassarre, and the expansive view of social 
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relations employed by Tito and Savonarola. In the first half of 
the novel, she is overly invested in the local relations of her life. 
obsessively devoted to her father and infatuated with Tito, Ro-
mola’s isolation and worldly inexperience is defined by the way 
she channels her sympathy into a single conduit. When Tito pro-
poses that they leave Florence, she responds by saying, “I am not 
thinking of other Italian cities and the whole civilized world—I am 
thinking of my father, and of my love and sorrow for him, and of 
his just claims on us. I would give up anything else … what else 
did I live for but for him and you?” (p. 271, emphasis added). As 
Romola becomes disillusioned with her marriage to Tito, she flees 
Florence and encounters Savonarola. his lecture on responsibil-
ity not only precipitates Romola’s return to her husband, but it 
also occasions the expansion of her sympathies from “the near 
and the loved” to the hungry citizenry outside her social orbit (p. 
305). As she begins to nurse those who fall ill during the famine, 
she develops a capacity for large-scale sympathy: “[S]he found 
herself involved in a crowd who suddenly fell on their knees; and 
she immediately knelt with them” (p. 356). Though she begins the 
novel by disavowing “other Italian cities and the whole civilized 
world,” Romola eventually replaces the myopia of her personal 
responsibilities with an expansive sense of social responsibility, 
one that opens her to the simultaneous experience of “the less 
fortunate of her fellow-citizens” (p. 367). 
however, when Savonarola executes her godfather, the ar-
bitrary separation of small and large-scale acts of sympathy is 
made devastatingly apparent: “It was inevitable that she should 
judge the Frate unfairly on a question of individual suffering, at 
which she looked with eyes of personal tenderness, and he with 
the eyes of theoretic conviction” (p. 472). Both Romola’s emphasis 
on local relations and Savonarola’s obsession with generalized 
social groups ultimately fail because the characters are unable 
to recognize that individual and large-scale acts of sympathy are 
mutually implicated. With the dichotomy of “personal tenderness” 
and “theoretic conviction” torturing her, Romola flees Florence for 
a second time. Distraught, she attempts suicide by lying down 
in the bottom of a small boat with the hope that she will blindly 
meet her death at sea. 
The way that the narrator describes Romola’s attempted sui-
cide signals the novel’s shift from a realist mode to a romantic 
one: “[F]ew had cared for her, while she had cared for many. She 
had done enough; she had striven after the impossible, and was 
weary of this stifling crowded life. She longed for that repose in 
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mere sensation which she had sometimes dreamed of in the sultry 
afternoons of her early girlhood, when she had fancied herself 
floating naiad-like in the waters” (p. 473). As Felicia Bonaparte 
notes, “when Romola enters the boat she falls asleep, and from 
that moment the narrative is like a dream sequence … [like] a 
medieval allegory in which real events are stripped of their com-
plexity and ambiguity and appear truly in their most fundamental 
relations in a world in which time is perceived in the context of 
eternity.”37 Multiple detachments occur here.38 Romola’s entrance 
into a dream-like state of detachment is matched by the narra-
tive’s dislocation from a realist register.39 Moreover, such acts of 
distancing are coupled with a temporal detachment that seems to 
take Romola out of the historical and into a synchronic mode—
a point that is corroborated by the way the villagers transform 
Romola’s intervention from the stuff of history to that of legend: 
“Many legends were afterwards told in that valley about the 
blessed Lady who came over the sea” (p. 527).40 
We have already seen acts of temporal detachment in Romola, 
as the synchronic, in the form of simultaneity, is a necessary con-
dition for engaging in large-scale sympathetic acts. For Romola, it 
is no different. Faced with a large group of people who need her 
help, Romola is wrenched from the torpor of self-pity and pro-
pelled into sympathetic action. her most extraordinary acts occur 
over the course of one paragraph, where she rescues a Jewish 
child from privation and reincorporates him into village society 
as a Christian, triumphing over the villagers’ fear of contamina-
tion and convincing them to help nurse the ill, bury the dead, 
and tend the crops. In contrast to Savonarola and Tito, whose 
large-scale sympathetic acts somehow destroy both themselves 
and the objects of their sympathies, Romola survives (although 
she falls ill shortly after) and leaves the village as a kind of pas-
toral utopia: “In this way, days, weeks, and months passed with 
Romola [recovering from her illness], till the men were digging 
and sowing again, till the women smiled at her as they carried 
their great vases on their heads to the well” (p. 526). Against the 
background of this bustling scene, Romola practices an enabling 
detachment that retroactively explains the success of her charity: 
“[h]er mind, travelling back over the past, and gazing across the 
undefined distance of the future, saw all objects from a new posi-
tion” (p. 527). The expansive temporal vista from which Romola 
surveys her social relations—synchronic arrangement of past 
and future—leads her to muse, “how could she feel the needs of 
others and not feel above all the needs of the nearest?” (p. 528). 
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This temporal detachment enables her to “feel the needs of oth-
ers” and the “needs of the nearest” simultaneously. Ultimately, 
her act of large-scale sympathy brings her back to sympathy on a 
smaller scale—the kind of local, individual relations that defined 
her experience early in the novel. 
The success of Romola’s act of large-scale sympathy does 
not come without a price—as I note above, she becomes ill after 
singlehandedly rescuing the village and ends the novel as a widow 
caring for the mistress and illegitimate children of her deceased 
husband. Moreover, it is important to note that the scale of Ro-
mola’s sympathy is narrower than the examples I discuss above. 
While Tito and Savonarola attempt to sympathize with incalcu-
lably large groups, Romola limits her sympathy to the relatively 
manageable number of “hardly more than a score” in the plague 
village (p. 526). After the failures of Tito and Savonarola, the tri-
umph of the plague village suggests that, for George Eliot, there 
is an optimal object for large-scale sympathy that hovers ambigu-
ously between the overwhelmingly huge and the myopically small 
and that is determined, in part, by the physiological and moral 
capabilities of the sympathizer. Finally, the detachment that 
enables Romola’s large-scale sympathy has the effect of turning 
the plague village episode into a romantic aside to the narrative’s 
realist mode. The dream-like and utopian qualities of this episode 
suggest at least two things about large-scale sympathy that we 
can take as representative of George Eliot’s position: large-scale 
sympathy is a fantasy that bears a vexed relation to the “reality” 
of direct experience and, surprisingly, this fantasy is something 
worth striving for. 
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